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INDIA

Indien und die Emergency - Demokratie in der Krise
(Thesenpapier)

Section Index


  1. Zeittafel
  2. Zur indischen Demokratie
  3. Zu Indira Gandhi
  4. "Ziele"
  5. Zur Wertung
  6. Bibliographie
see also the respective Term Paper


  What's Related  
  Subseq. Pages - Essays & Papers  
 






"Denn, um mit wenigen Worten die Wahrheit zu sagen: wer immer seit jener Zeit politisch agitierte, schützte ehrenvolle Parolen vor. Die einen taten, als verteidigten sie die Rechte des Volkes, andere, als wollten sie die Autorität des Senats wahren. Indem sie das Allgemeinwohl vorschützten, kämpften sie alle nur für die eigene Macht"
[Sallust. Coniuratio Catilinae. 38,3]

1. Zeittafel

1971 Sieg des Congress bei Lok Sabha-Wahlen Slogan "Garibi hatao - Bekämpft die Armut"
Dez. 1971 Sieg über Pakistan im Krieg um Bangladesh
März 1972 Sieg des Congress bei State Assembly Polls, Sozialisten klagen wg. Wahlbetrugs
ab 1972 Preisanstieg, generelle Verschlechterung der ökonomischen Lage, Opposition unter J.P. Narayan wächst
1975 3/4 - Mehrheit im Parlament, Congress-Regierungen in 19 von 21 Staaten
6. März 1975 JP Massendemonstration von 500'000 gg Indira, 1km von ihrer Wohnung entfernt
12. Juni 1975 Richter Jagmohan Lal Sinha vom Allahabad High Court befindet Indira zweier Korruptionsvergehen in Uttar Pradesh für schuldig, Parl.-mandat aberkannt, darf für 6 Jahre kein gewähltes Amt innehaben, Indira denkt an Rücktritt
24. Juni 1975 Dem Urteil wird durch den Obersten Gerichtshof prozedurale Korrektheit bestätigt und für "iron cast" erklärt. Indira will zurücktreten, Sanjay dagegen (wäre wegen Betrug und Unterschlagung ins Gefängnis gekommen), fordert sie auf, Mut zu zeigen
25. Juni 1975 Großkundgebung JPs, Rücktritt Indiras gefordert Abend: Treffen Indiras mit ihren Beratern, Präsident Fakruddin Ali Ahmed unterzeichnet die Erklärung des Notstands. Opposition hinter Jagjivan Ram gegen Indira, will noch bis zum nä. Tag warten
22:00, 25.06., Beginn der Aktion "Hari Aum"
26. Juni 1975 05:00 Verhaftung der 400 wichtigsten Oppositionsführer (darunter JP).
06:00 Ministerkonferenz.
In Nacht 25./26. 6375 politische Gegner verhaftet, 676 Verhaftungen zugegeben
  Radioansage: "Es gebe kein Zurück mehr, erklärte sie dem Volk übers Radio. Die Demokratie hätte den Leuten zu viele Freiheiten gelassen. Die Opposition habe das Land durch eine Sabotagewelle lahmlegen wollen, deshalb habe die Regierung zuschlagen müssen. Bedauernd fügte sie hinzu, ihrer Meinung nach hätte das schon viel früher geschehen sollen. Inzwischen hat sie an die 30 politische Parteien verboten." [Spiegel Nr. 28, 7.7.1975, 70] Zeitungen zensiert, verboten, Chefredakteur der oppositionellen Zeitung Motherland verhaftet, Lewis Simons (Washington Post) ausgewiesen, Journalisten dürfen nur berichten, was offizielle Stellen ihnen mitteilen.
  "Pressefreiheit" sei ausgeartet "zur Freiheit, Indira Gandhi zu kritisieren"
[Indira Gandhi, Spiegel Nr. 32, 4.8. 1975]
  Motto "Emergency - an Era of Discipline" (Vinoba Bhave)
  Unterstützung durch Brezhnev / UdSSR / Moskau-Flügel der CPI: "Das 'wilde Baccharnal' rechter Kräfte, einen wahren 'Hexensabbat' der Reaktionäre habe Indiens Herrscherin nachgerade bewunderungswürdig gestoppt" [Literaturnaya Gasyeta, in: Spiegel Nr. 29, 14.7.1975]
  Planung: Mohamed Junus, zuletzt Chef der Pakistan-Abteilung im Kriegsministerium (Krieg gg Pakistan, Errichtung der unabh. VR Bangladesh); RAW - Research and Analyses Wing: Private Geheimpolizei
Ausführung: CRP - Central Reserve Police, mobiles EinsatzKdo; Border Security Force, von 45'000 auf 100'000 Mitglieder gewachsen
2. Juli 1975 "Sie haben mich einen Diktator genant, als ich keiner war. Ja, jetzt bin ich einer." [Indira Gandhi, Spiegel Nr. 16 / 12.4.1976]
19. Juli 1975 Erste Bulldozer-Aktionen. Während Sanjays Operation "saubere Stadt" wurden Mio Basarhändler, Bettler, Slumbewohner vertrieben, Hütten mit Bulldozern zerstört.
28. August 1975 116'000 Gefangene; Probleme in Gefängnissen wegen Massenverhaftungen (Folter: Fußfesseln, Hals, Beine, Genitalien mit glühenden Zigaretten verbrannt, roter Pfeffer ins Rectum eingeführt, selbst ältere Politiker mit Stöcken geschlagen)
2. Oktober 1975 Verbot des öffentlichen Alkoholausschanks (Gandhi gg Alkohol, Verfassung schreibt Prohibition vor), durch Schwarzbrennen zusätzliche Probleme (Methanol)
Mitte Oktober Gesetz, das es Gefangenen verbietet, durch die Justiz wieder freizukommen. Jeder kann jederzeit ohne Angabe von Gründen auf unbestimmte Zeit verhaftet werden
13. April 1976 Turkman Gate
18. Januar 1977 Wahlen ausgeschrieben
28. März 1977 Vernichtende Niederlage des Congress, Sieg der Janata-Partei in geeinter Opposition






2. Zur indischen Demokratie

Demokratie

Even in normal times democracy is a difficult and, for the rulers, the most inconvenient system to work. Its survival depends on the willingness of those running the system to endure a great deal of what is irritating and obnoxious in their opponents. [..] From the moment the rulers' judgement is dictated by their personal likes and dislikes or convenience, they move down an inclined plane. Soon fancies would appear as facts and criticism as subversion. When rulers appear in their own eyes in the role of saviours of the integrity of the nation, preservation of their own rule tends to be identified with the preservation of the nation itself. Intolerance towards opponents may then begin to assume the aura of unflinching determination to defend the nation. [Emergency in Perspective. 17]

Notfallmaßnahmen

If public safety and order be seriously disturbed the executive authority of the federation may also suspend the provisions of the constitution concerning freedom of speech, association and assembly and inviolability of person, home and correspondence in the manner and to the extent determined by the federal law for such occasion. [aus dem Vorschlag für das Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly, 1948, zur Einarbeitung in die Verfassung, verfaßt u.a. von JP (!). B. Shiva Roa (Ed.) Framing of India's Constitution, Vol IV. New Delhi: Indian Institute of Public Administration, 364. Zitiert in Emergency in Perspective. 21]

Also it would be noted that all the draconian powers taking away the liberties of the citizens which were in operation during the Emergency were recommended in clause (d) [s.a.] of Mr Jayaprakash Narayan's proposals. [Emergency in Perspective. 22]

Menschenwürde

Over a thousand persons killed in a small region did not seem to cause any concern in the country. Perhaps people did not know much as to what was happening. Maybe the concern for the integrity of the nation-state was so overwhelming that loss of lives of nation's own citizens did not count for much. But more likely because those who were the opinion leaders of society did not bother since those killed were poor peasants and tribals whose citizenship was a mere formality in an elitist world. The nation was getting insensitised for the things to come later. [Emergency in Perspective. 20]

This insensitivity to human life again emanated from our peculiar social situation. In a country where poor men form the over-whelming majority the value of property or the things that constitute property must be held higher than the value of human life if the institution of private property and privileges were to survive. A political leadership either committed to safeguarding property or having roots in the privileged strata of the population could not be expected to show excessive regard for the lives of the poor. [Emergency in Perspective. 24]

Authoritarismus

It has been a curious feature of India's political life in the post-independence era that parties accused each other of authoritarian intent, and in their concern to save democracy demanded just those remedies which were likely to promote authoritarianism. While the accusations were often far-fetched, originating either in rhetorical flourish or polemic, the remedies suggested were real and instilled among the general public a sense of apathy towards anti-democratic actions of the state. [Emergency in Perspective. 26]

Stabilität

[T]he formal aspects of democracy itself had to be so structured as to direct it through safe channels. This required certain conditions to be laid at the outset as axiomatic. One such condition is rooted in the fetish of stability. Stability often means stability of a given system of relationships, which invariably has, in our present world, embedded within it a certain class of privileges. But people who are defending some vested interests of their own would not easily admit even to themselves that they are doing so. Their aims are camouflaged in some such disjunctive affirmation as: freedom yes, instability never. With such false dichotomy one could easily beguile oneself and others about the real issues involved. [Emergency in Perspective. 30]

If we examine the condition of the people or their rights during the past decade, we would find that the government at the Centre became responsive to them precisely in the years when it was least stable. This was for example, the situation in 1969-70 when after the congress split Mrs Indira Gandhi's government at the Centre had a precarious majority. It was during this period too that for the first time the law for preventive detention was allowed to lapse. Also it was around this time that maximum concessions were made to the demands of the workers and other weaker sections of the population. After 1971 we had a very stable govern-ment. But this period also saw the gradual erosion of people's rights culminating finally in the dictatorship of 1975-76. [Emergency in Perspective. 31]







3. Zu Indira Gandhi

  Indira Priyadarshini Gandhi 
Indira Gandhi
* 19.11.1917, Allahabad
† 31.10.1984, New Delhi

Studium:
Visva-Bharati University, Bengal,
University of Oxford, England.

1938 Congress-Mitglied
1942 vh. Feroze Gandhi (†1960)
1955 Congress Working Committee
1959-1960 Parteipräsident
1964 Mai † Jawaharlal Nehru
1964 minister of infrm. & broadcasting in Lal Bahadur Shastri's Reg.
1966 † Shastri

Premierminister
I. 1966-1967
II. 1967-1971
III. 1971-1977
IV. 1980-1984
1980 † Sohn Sanjay (*1946)

1984, 31. Okt, ermordet von ihren Sikh-Leibwächtern, nachdem sie im Juni 1984 einen Armeeangriff auf den Sikh-Tempel in Amritsar befohlen hatte
 

"Servant"

I have always considered myself a desh sevika [servant of the nation] even as my father regarded himself as the first servant of the nation. I also consider myself a servant of the party and of the great people of this country. Ours is an ancient country with a great tradition and heritage. There is something in this country which enables its people, for all their illiteracy and backwardness, to rise to the occasion when face to face with mighty challenges. I have every hope that with unity we shall be able to tackle the difficult problems facing us. [..] I thank both those who voted for me and those who voted against me. I will support you all. I hope all of you will fully support me and take the country forward. [Rede nach Wahl zur Parteivorsitzenden, 19.01. 1966. Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi. 3]

Prioritäten

Peace we want because there is another war to fight - the war against poverty, disease and ignorance. We have promises to keep with our people - of work, food, clothing and shelter, health and education. The weaker and underprivileged sections of our people - all those who require special measures of social security - have always been and will remain uppermost in my mind. ["A Pledge Renewed". Broadcast over All India Radio, 26. 01. 1966. ibd. 6f]

Tempo

I would like to emphasize that many of these difficulties are due to the fact that we in India are trying to develop at a very rapid pace. We are trying to achieve within decade or so what many countries have achieved over a longer period. This is not mere idealism. It is a necessity for a country placed as India is. It may be easy to slow down our development, but that will be a con-fession of defeat. I am sure that neither this House nor the country would wish this to happen. ["Problems of Growth". From reply to debate in Lok Sabha on President's Address, March 1, 1966. ibd. 8]

Gewalt

I am one of those who abhor the use of force in any circumstance. But when there is incitement to violence and when violence leads to acts of defiance of law, [..] then there is no other way; it can only be met by force. ["The Cult of Violence". From reply to debate in Lok Sabha on a no-confidence motion, Nov 7, 1966. ibd. 14]

Opposition

We want to establish democracy in this country. There is mudslinging from every side about authoritarian ways, but I doubt whether anywhere else in the world you will find a party with such a great majority putting up with so much from an extremely divided opposition. The opposition has an important role to play in a democracy. But I submit that sometimes they take advantage of it, and it is because of this that we witness the scenes which we are witnessing outside. Some of the methods being used today cut at the very roots of democracy. Democracy cannot exist if the rule of law goes and if law and order are constantly violated. [ibd. 15]

Anti-demokratisch

Where have my calculations gone wrong? [..] I went wrong in assuming that a Prime Minister in a democracy would use all the normal and abnormal laws to defeat a peaceful democratic movement, but would not destroy democracy itself and substitute it for a totalitarian system. [JP. Prison Diary. 1]

I had always believed that Mrs Gandhi had no faith in democracy, that she was by inclination and conviction a dictator. [JP. Prison Diary. 3]

Sanjay

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, distrustful of even her closest Cabinet colleagues at this time of grave crisis for India, is turning to her controversial younger son, Sanjay, for help in making major political decisions .... A family friend who attended a dinner party with Sanjay and Mrs Gandhi several months ago said he saw the son slap his mother across the face "six times". She couldn't do a thing. The friend said: "She just stood there and took it. She is scared to death of him. [Lewis M. Simons, "Sanjay and his Mother", Article für die Washington Post, zitiert in The Judgement. 53]

Sanjay: "Indien hatte in 2000 Jahren nicht so viel Fortschritt aufzuweisen wie seit Verkündigung des Ausnahmezustandes", "Der Ausnahmezustand hat Indien vor dem Chaos gerettet" [Der Spiegel, Nr. 16/12.4.1976]

"Agitation"

Every single peasant is trying to do whatever he can. He is not interested in speeches. He is not interested in agitation and demands. He is trying to utilise every second of his time and every ounce of his energy to produce whatever he can, to retrieve whatever he can. On the other hand, we find people in the cities and in other places, who instead of trying to see what they can do to help these people, create trouble by starting agitations. [ibd. 16f]

Alternativen

Political battles are often fought around symbols. But these symbols often concretise a complex of attitudes to real problems. Where such problems remain undefined the symbols point to vague abstractions. The personality of Mrs Gandhi became such a symbol signifying vague aspirations to some and anathema to others. Her chief strength lay in projecting herself as the saviour of the poor through a series of clever manoeuvres and catchy slogans after the split in the Congress in 1969. It cost her nothing in terms of real concessions to the poor. [..] She got a two-thirds majority in the Lok Sabha and comfortable majorities in most of the States. She was poised, if she wanted, to bring about any kind of revolutionary change into the socio-economic field. Bud she did practically nothing. Slogans can win only temporary laurels. They are not solutions of concrete problems. So while the walls were being plastered with slogans eulogising her great achievements, the basic economic issues kept fermenting underneath. Sooner or later she had to settle account with these issues. The year of 1974 faced her with the choice of her life. She had either to abjure the pace of surface manoeuvres and settle down to the real problem of changing society or curb people's aspirations (she herself had raised) using in full measure the new power she had acquired. [Emergency in Perspective. 42]

She had acquired power. But to retain that power she had to remain a prisoner of the vested interests and the forces she had fostered around her. And they closed to her the other path to power that lies in efforts to gain the genuine support of the people: through dedication to their cause. That entailed willingness to abdicate power if people so wished, i.e., the whole-hearted acceptance of the democratic credo. The path of power she had chosen, the only path of power open to those who in the context of Indian poverty hope to tread without hurting the susceptibilities of the privileged, led to one destination: some kind of authoritarianism. She had already forged the instrument of a police state with the expansion of the intelligence network to keep a watchful eye on the activities of the citizens, the politicians and even her own cabinet colleagues. Every kind of intelligence was placed directly under her. [..] The Allahabad High Court verdict of 12 June 1975 [..] accelerated the march to her inexorable destiny. [Emergency in Perspective. 46-48]

Ausrede

Every dictator needs a grandiose purpose as an excuse to impose his or her dictatorship. And Mrs Gandhi too had to find one. So it was announced that there was a deep-laid conspiracy to undermine the democratic system in the country. [Emergency in Perspective. 50]

Bürokratie

Now all law and authority flowed from Mrs Gandhi and the small coterie surrounding her. But perhaps that too only ostensibly and at the highest level where major political decisions were taken. For the rest the decision lay with the bureaucratic apparatus which suddenly came into its own. The vast bureaucracy which always nursed its old contempt for the people and popular authority found its finest hour. It suddenly revived. [Emergency in Perspective. 56]

Verantwortung

It is extremely naive to blame the large number of murders and tortures in police custody on Mrs Gandhi and Sanjay Gandhi. Local administration was directly responsible for most of them. Mrs Gandhi of course is responsible indirectly for bringing into existence a system which must thrive on the criminal propensities of the law enforcement authority. [Emergency in Perspective. 57]

Terror

The chief instrument of dictatorship is terror. And people can be terrorised only when the blow on them falls inexplicably and unexpectedly - that is, in arbitrary manner. The moment limitations are set by law, morals or custom, the administrative action could be anticipated, remedies devised and the element of terror minimised. So no dictatorship can be benign or benevolent. It has to rest on the shoulders of little dictators, each of whom has his own axe to grind, and invariably at the cost of the people. [Emergency in Perspective. 58]

"Erfolge"

When we look closely at the claimed economic achievements of the Emergency, we find that they are largely non-existent. The simple truth is that force is no substitute for sound economic policy. It is not possible to find a police remedy for a systemic malady. [Emergency in Perspective. 65]

Apparat

A very notable feature of the Emergency was that in order to enforce its harsh measures, Mrs Gandhi did not have to create a special organisation like the storm troopers or the Gestapo or to introduce in the administration a gang of genocidal maniacs. The existing administration was found good enough to carry out her wishes willingly. Even when there had been serious violations of law and constitution, there was no refusal. Often the administration went beyond the express orders. This revealed where the real commitment of the bureaucracy in this country lay. [Emergency in Perspective. 65]

There has been much talk of dismantling the whole apparatus of dictatorship. The question that immediately comes to one's mind is: Which apparatus? Mrs. Gandhi hardly created any new apparatus. She used the same apparatus which she found ready to her hand, and it is the same apparatus which is serving the new incumbents in office. There has been far more continuity in the mode of government between the one that preceded Mrs Gandhi and the one that was in operation during the Emergency than the present rulers are inclined to admit. The seed of dictatorship was always there in that old apparatus. That seed has not been uprooted even now and only lies waiting to germinate and throw up its noxious foliage whenever conditions permit it. [Emergency in Perspective. 86f]

Presse

Under strong inducement, be it from fear, patronage or venality, such men will misrepresent or lie about even those whom they now think they serve. The fact that almost the entire journalistic outfit continued its uninterrupted career from the pre-Emergency days, through the Emergency, to the present, is not without its significance. Perhaps all the three kinds of inducement were at work. Fear perhaps was the dominant one; but the other two were not always absent. [Emergency in Perspective. 86]

Sterilisierungen

The only kind of sterilisation that the peasant had known before was the castration of his cattle. Now when men could be caught and forcibly sterilised the implication became clear. In the eyes of the government the status of a poor man was no better than that of an animal. Thus so long as there was democracy, however poor, his status was that of a man. Now under a dictatorship he was reduced to an animal. [Emergency in Perspective. 70]

Ende

A dictator is rarely loved. But when from being an object of awe and reverence the dictator becomes an object of ridicule the days of the dictator are numbered. [Emergency in Perspective. 73]

Maybe she thought that the economy was taking a turn for the worse and was likely to go downhill for some more time. The prices had already begun to move up. Prospect of agricultural production was not too bright. Unemployment continued to mount. And while production in the public sector had picked up, private sector showed continued stagnation or decline. Sooner or later she had to go to the polls, since even dictators have to legitimise their rule, specially a civilian dictator. Because once the armed forces begin to feel that they are the sole prop of the dictator, their ambition to rule directly is likely to rise. So she had to seek election before the situation grew worse. And perhaps she became a victim of her own propaganda which a controlled Press and radio carried on relentlessly. With the silencing of all criticism she lacked the feedback to correct her course. She was lulled into the false belief that she enjoyed unchallenged popularity. [Emergency in Perspective. 75f]

Indira Gandhi had reached a state in her mental make-up which, I am convinced, could have taken her along to martial law, had she found circumstances more propitious. [..] Once the army tasted blood there would be no way to control it. [..] Indira Gandhi did not resign for two days. On 22 March a sleek Toyota car was seen being packed with tins, presumably containing money. [..] The little Toyota was making sure that the money would survive to fight another battle one day. Indira Gandhi was not the kind to give up. [Two Faces of Indira Gandhi. 192]







4. "Ziele"

Die 20 Punkte Indira Gandhis:

  • Scaling down prices of essential commodities and streamlining their production and distribution

  • Economizing government expenditure.

  • Implementing agricultural land ceilings and speeding up distribution of surplus land and compilation of land records.

  • Stepping up house-site availability to the landless and weaker sections.

  • Declaring bonded labour illegal.

  • Planning for liquidation of rural indebtedness and a moratorium on recovery of debts from the landless, labourers, small farmers and artisans.

  • Reviewing laws on minimum agricultural wages.

  • Bringing five million more hectares under irrigation and preparing a national programme for use of underground water.

  • Increasing power production.

  • Developing the handloom sector and improving quality and supply of people's cloth.

  • Effecting "socialization" of urban and urbanizable land and having ceiling on ownership and possession of vacant land.

  • Having special squads for valuation of conspicuous consumption and prevention of tax evasion and summary trials and deterrent punishment of economic offenders.

  • Special legislation for confiscation of smugglers' properties.

  • Liberalizing investment procedures and taking action against misuse of import licences.

  • New schemes for workers' associations in industry.

  • National permit schemes for road transport.

  • Income tax relief to middle class - exceptional limit placed at Rs 8,000.

  • Essential commodities at controlled prices to students in hostels.

  • Books and stationary at controlled prices.

  • New apprenticeship scheme to enlarge employment and training, specially of the weaker sections.

Die 4 Punkte Sanjay Gandhis:

Jeder Inder soll

  • jedes Jahr einen Baum pflanzen

  • mindestens 1 Mitbürger Schreiben und Lesen beibringen

  • die alte Kultur des Landes wiederbeleben

  • nicht mehr als 2 Kinder haben







5. Zur Wertung

  • Die Emergency konnte auf grundlegende anti-demokratische, elitäre und autoritäre Tendenzen in der indischen Gesellschaft zurückgreifen

  • Die Emergency war schon länger geplant, das Gerichtsurteil gegen Indira Gandhi beschleunigte den Prozeß nur.

  • Da die Bevölkerung repressive Maßnahmen in der Vergangenheit bereits "gewohnt" war, war mit sofortigem Widerstand nicht zu rechnen.

  • Die Emergency war weder notwendig, da der Congress bereits über eine 2/3-Mehrheit in der Lok Sabha verfügte, noch erfolgreich, da sie nicht auf sachpolitischen Entscheidungen beruhte, sondern auf machtpolitischen.

  • Das Ausbleiben sichtbaren Fortschritts seit dem Erreichen der Unabhängigkeit mag in der Emergency ein Ventil gefunden haben. Überzeugender scheint aber das Argument, daß die Elite viel zu undemokratisch war, um das Spiel der Demokratie über lange Zeit zu spielen.

  • In der Emergency äußert sich somit wohl auch so etwas wie die Verachtung des einfachen Volkes. Das Entfernen der Slums könnte man unter dem Stichwort "Out of Sight - Out of Mind" sehen.

  • In einem Staat mit funktionierender demokratischer Basis hätte eine Diktatur nicht derart einfach errichtet werden können.

  • Wie auch in faschistischen und kommunistischen Systemen, fußte die Diktatur Indira Gandhis im wesentlichen auf der Bürokratie. Greueltaten mußten oft nicht einmal befohlen werden.

  • Eine Einordnung der Emergency in politische Richtungen erscheint schwer. Ob direkt von Symptoms of Fascism zu sprechen ist, scheint zumindest fraglich - schließlich traten die repressiven Maßnahmen nicht allein in den 19 Monaten der Emergency auf. Auch ist die Kooperation der CPI und Moskaus mit Indira Gandhi zumindest bedenkenswert.







6. Bibliographie

  • Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi. January 1966 - August 1969. Publications Division, Ministry of Informatin and Broadcasting, Government of India.
  • John Dayal, Ajoy Bose. For Reasons of State. Delhi under Emergency. New Delhi: Ess Ess 1977
  • Jayaprakash Narayan. Prison Diary. Bombay: Popular Prakashan Private Limited 1977
  • Kuldip Nayar. The Judgement. Inside Story of the Emergency in India. New Delhi: Vikas 1977
  • Arun Shourie. Symptoms of Fascism. New Delhi: Vikas 1978
  • Sachchidanand Sinha. Emergency in Perspective. Reprieve & Challenge. New Delhi: Heritage Publishers 1977
  • Uma Vasudev. Two Faces of Indira Gandhi. New Delhi: Vikas 1977
  • Der Spiegel, div. Ausgaben 1975-1977

PJK
June 22nd / September 23rd, 2000 [HTML Version]





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